CVE-2020-1730: libssh - denial of service when handling AES-CTR (or DES) ciphers
libssh is a multiplatform C library implementing the SSHv2 protocol on client and server side. Recently a security advisory was released for "Denial of service vulnerability" in libssh.
Important information from advisory -
Let's go through each point mentioned in advisory -
1. Affected when handling AES-CTR keys with OpenSSL
The AES-CTR cipher related information is defined in libcrypto.c. The exploitation is possible when OPENSSL AES support is enabled and OpenSSL EVP interface is not supported.
For this analysis I used aes128-ctr mode and a connection from client-to-server.
libcrypto.c
2. Connection hasn't been fully initialized
To trigger this issue, another condition is that connection should not be fully initialized. The typical SSH connection session looks like -
To trigger this condition, connection needs to be disconnected in between session key exchange so that it's not fully initialized. The session key exchange is handled by ssh_handle_key_exchange().This function internally calls multiple interesting functions.
session.c
3. Cleanup cipher information
During session, if connection ended abruptly, the termination function fct(user) = -2 is returned and polling is stopped.
session.c
client.c
wrapper.c
wrapper.c
wrapper.c
The cleanup function which is defined with specific cipher i.e. aes128-ctr is called.
libcrypto.c
The cryptographic material used for the session contains sensitive information. To clean this sensitive information explicit_bzero() function is called. This function guarantees that compiler optimizations will not remove the erase operation if the compiler deduces that the operation is "unnecessary".
libcrypto.c
Test environment:
References:
libssh is a multiplatform C library implementing the SSHv2 protocol on client and server side. Recently a security advisory was released for "Denial of service vulnerability" in libssh.
Important information from advisory -
- Possible DoS in client and server when handling AES-CTR keys with OpenSSL
- Connection hasn't been fully initialized
- Issue arises in cleanup of ciphers when closing the connection
1. Affected when handling AES-CTR keys with OpenSSL
The AES-CTR cipher related information is defined in libcrypto.c. The exploitation is possible when OPENSSL AES support is enabled and OpenSSL EVP interface is not supported.
For this analysis I used aes128-ctr mode and a connection from client-to-server.
libcrypto.c
704 #else /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_AES_CTR */
705 {
706 .name = "aes128-ctr",
707 .blocksize = 16,
708 .ciphertype = SSH_AES128_CTR,
709 .keysize = 128,
710 .set_encrypt_key = aes_ctr_set_key,
711 .set_decrypt_key = aes_ctr_set_key,
712 .encrypt = aes_ctr_encrypt,
713 .decrypt = aes_ctr_encrypt,
714 .cleanup = aes_ctr_cleanup
715 },2. Connection hasn't been fully initialized
To trigger this issue, another condition is that connection should not be fully initialized. The typical SSH connection session looks like -
ssh_handle_key_exchange -> ssh_handle_packets_termination -> ssh_handle_packets -> ssh_timeout_elapsedThe ssh_handle_packets_termination() keeps polling the current session for an event and call the appropriate callbacks.630 int ssh_handle_key_exchange(ssh_session session) {631 int rc; 632 if (session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_NONE) 633 goto pending; 634 rc = ssh_send_banner(session, 1); 635 if (rc < 0) { 636 return SSH_ERROR; 637 } 638 639 session->alive = 1; 640 641 session->ssh_connection_callback = ssh_server_connection_callback; 642 session->session_state = SSH_SESSION_STATE_SOCKET_CONNECTED; 643 ssh_socket_set_callbacks(session->socket,&session->socket_callbacks); 644 session->socket_callbacks.data=callback_receive_banner; 645 session->socket_callbacks.exception=ssh_socket_exception_callback; 646 session->socket_callbacks.userdata=session; 647 648 rc = server_set_kex(session); 649 if (rc < 0) { 650 return SSH_ERROR; 651 } 652 pending: 653 rc = ssh_handle_packets_termination(session, SSH_TIMEOUT_USER, 654 ssh_server_kex_termination,session); 655 SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PACKET, "ssh_handle_key_exchange: current state : %d", 656 session->session_state); 657 if (rc != SSH_OK) 658 return rc; 659 if (session->session_state == SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR || 660 session->session_state == SSH_SESSION_STATE_DISCONNECTED) { 661 return SSH_ERROR; 662 } 663 664 return SSH_OK; 665 }
session.c
635 /**
636 * @internal
637 *
638 * @brief Poll the current session for an event and call the appropriate
639 * callbacks.
640 *
641 * This will block until termination function returns true, or timeout expired.
642 *
643 * @param[in] session The session handle to use.
644 *
645 * @param[in] timeout Set an upper limit on the time for which this function
646 * will block, in milliseconds. Specifying SSH_TIMEOUT_INFINITE
647 * (-1) means an infinite timeout.
648 * Specifying SSH_TIMEOUT_USER means to use the timeout
649 * specified in options. 0 means poll will return immediately.
650 * SSH_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT uses blocking parameters of the session.
651 * This parameter is passed to the poll() function.
652 *
653 * @param[in] fct Termination function to be used to determine if it is
654 * possible to stop polling.
655 * @param[in] user User parameter to be passed to fct termination function.
656 * @return SSH_OK on success, SSH_ERROR otherwise.
657 */
658 int ssh_handle_packets_termination(ssh_session session,
659 int timeout,
660 ssh_termination_function fct,
661 void *user)
662 {3. Cleanup cipher information
During session, if connection ended abruptly, the termination function fct(user) = -2 is returned and polling is stopped.
session.c
......
688 while(!fct(user)) {
689 ret = ssh_handle_packets(session, tm);
690 if (ret == SSH_ERROR) {
691 break;
692 }
693 if (ssh_timeout_elapsed(&ts,timeout)) {
694 ret = fct(user) ? SSH_OK : SSH_AGAIN; <-- SSH_AGAIN = -2
695 break;
696 }
697
698 tm = ssh_timeout_update(&ts, timeout);
699 }
700
701 return ret;
702 }
ssh_handle_key_exchange(session) != SSH_OKclient.c
As the name suggests, function cyrpto_free() starts cleaning of cryptographic parameters used in session.652 /** 653 * @brief Disconnect from a session (client or server). 654 * The session can then be reused to open a new session. 655 * 656 * @param[in] session The SSH session to use. 657 */658 void ssh_disconnect(ssh_session session) {659 struct ssh_iterator *it; 660 int rc; ......... 699 if (session->next_crypto) { 700 crypto_free(session->next_crypto); 701 session->next_crypto = crypto_new(); 702 if (session->next_crypto == NULL) { 703 ssh_set_error_oom(session); 704 } 705 }
wrapper.c
146 void crypto_free(struct ssh_crypto_struct *crypto)
147 {
148 size_t i;
149
150 if (crypto == NULL) { <-- # we need to initiate KX to satisfy this
151 return;
152 }
153
154 ssh_key_free(crypto->server_pubkey);
155
156 cipher_free(crypto->in_cipher); <-- #cryptographic information from other party
157 cipher_free(crypto->out_cipher);
wrapper.c
130 static void cipher_free(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher) {
131 ssh_cipher_clear(cipher);
132 SAFE_FREE(cipher);
133 } (gdb) print session->next_crypto
$8 = (struct ssh_crypto_struct *) 0x40a120
150 if (crypto == NULL) {
(gdb) print crypto
$9 = (struct ssh_crypto_struct *) 0x40a120
156 cipher_free(crypto->in_cipher);
(gdb) print crypto->in_cipher
$10 = (struct ssh_cipher_struct *) 0x411870
131 ssh_cipher_clear(cipher);
(gdb) print cipher
$13 = (struct ssh_cipher_struct *) 0x411870
(gdb) print cipher->aes_key
$14 = (struct ssh_aes_key_schedule *) 0x0
125 if (cipher->cleanup != NULL) {
(gdb) print cipher->cleanup
$15 = (void (*)(struct ssh_cipher_struct *)) 0xb7f8c07f <aes_ctr_cleanup>
(gdb) print cipher->aes_key
$16 = (struct ssh_aes_key_schedule *) 0x0
107 void ssh_cipher_clear(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher){
......
125 if (cipher->cleanup != NULL) {
126 cipher->cleanup(cipher);
127 }
128 }
The cleanup function which is defined with specific cipher i.e. aes128-ctr is called.
libcrypto.c
704 #else /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_AES_CTR */
705 {
706 .name = "aes128-ctr",
....
714 .cleanup = aes_ctr_cleanup
715 },
The cryptographic material used for the session contains sensitive information. To clean this sensitive information explicit_bzero() function is called. This function guarantees that compiler optimizations will not remove the erase operation if the compiler deduces that the operation is "unnecessary".
libcrypto.c
643 static void aes_ctr_cleanup(struct ssh_cipher_struct *cipher){
644 explicit_bzero(cipher->aes_key, sizeof(*cipher->aes_key));
645 SAFE_FREE(cipher->aes_key);
646 }
void
explicit_bzero(void *b, size_t len);
The explicit_bzero() variant behaves the same, but will not be removed by
a compiler's dead store optimization pass, making it useful for clearing
sensitive memory such as a password.
433 /* Set N bytes of S to 0. The compiler will not delete a call to this
434 function, even if S is dead after the call. */
435 extern void explicit_bzero (void *__s, size_t __n) __THROW __nonnull ((1));
126 cipher->cleanup(cipher);
(gdb) x/10xw cipher->aes_key
0x0: Cannot access memory at address 0x0
aes_ctr_cleanup (cipher=0x411870) at /home/developer/code-review/libssh-0.8.8/src/libcrypto.c:644
644 explicit_bzero(cipher->aes_key, sizeof(*cipher->aes_key));
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memset_ia32 () at ../sysdeps/i386/i686/memset.S:77
77 in ../sysdeps/i386/i686/memset.S
Test environment:
OS: Debian GNU/Linux 10 (buster)
Server: examples/ssh_server_fork.c , removed fork() for this analysis.
Server-logs:
[2020/05/05 16:32:41.639034, 2] ssh_pki_import_privkey_base64: Trying to decode privkey passphrase=false
[2020/05/05 16:32:41.639321, 2] ssh_pki_openssh_import: Opening OpenSSH private key: ciphername: none, kdf: none, nkeys: 1
[2020/05/05 16:32:41.639674, 2] ssh_pki_import_privkey_base64: Trying to decode privkey passphrase=false
[2020/05/05 16:32:41.639929, 2] ssh_pki_openssh_import: Opening OpenSSH private key: ciphername: none, kdf: none, nkeys: 1
[2020/05/05 16:32:41.640235, 2] ssh_pki_import_privkey_base64: Trying to decode privkey passphrase=false
[2020/05/05 16:32:41.640570, 2] ssh_pki_openssh_import: Opening OpenSSH private key: ciphername: none, kdf: none, nkeys: 1
[2020/05/05 16:33:44.119994, 3] ssh_socket_pollcallback: Received POLLOUT in connecting state
[2020/05/05 16:33:44.120028, 3] callback_receive_banner: Received banner: SSH-2.0-libssh_0.8.8
[2020/05/05 16:33:44.120035, 1] ssh_server_connection_callback: SSH client banner: SSH-2.0-libssh_0.8.8
[2020/05/05 16:33:44.120040, 1] ssh_analyze_banner: Analyzing banner: SSH-2.0-libssh_0.8.8
[2020/05/05 16:33:44.120060, 3] packet_send2: packet: wrote [len=708,padding=6,comp=701,payload=701]
[2020/05/05 16:33:44.120080, 3] ssh_socket_unbuffered_write: Enabling POLLOUT for socket
[2020/05/05 16:33:45.968933, 3] ssh_packet_socket_callback: packet: read type 20 [len=588,padding=4,comp=583,payload=583]
[2020/05/05 16:33:45.968954, 3] ssh_packet_process: Dispatching handler for packet type 20
[2020/05/05 16:33:45.968974, 3] ssh_packet_kexinit: The client supports extension negotiation. Enabled signature algorithms: SHA512
[2020/05/05 16:33:45.968993, 2] ssh_kex_select_methods: Negotiated curve25519-sha256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,aes128-ctr,aes256-ctr,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-256,none,none,,
[2020/05/05 16:33:45.968999, 3] crypt_set_algorithms_server: Set output algorithm aes256-ctr
[2020/05/05 16:33:45.969004, 3] crypt_set_algorithms_server: Set HMAC output algorithm to hmac-sha2-256
[2020/05/05 16:33:45.969008, 3] crypt_set_algorithms_server: Set input algorithm aes128-ctr
[2020/05/05 16:33:45.969013, 3] crypt_set_algorithms_server: Set HMAC input algorithm to hmac-sha2-256
[2020/05/05 16:33:47.811206, 1] ssh_socket_exception_callback: Socket exception callback: 1 (0)
[2020/05/05 16:33:47.811227, 1] ssh_socket_exception_callback: Socket error: disconnected
[2020/05/05 16:33:47.811255, 3] ssh_handle_key_exchange: ssh_handle_key_exchange: current state : 9
Socket error: disconnected
Segmentation faultReferences:
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2020-1730
- https://www.libssh.org/security/advisories/CVE-2020-1730.txt
- https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=explicit_bzero
- http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/bzero.3.html
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